A well-known result in public economics is that capital income should not be taxed in the long run. This result has been derived using necessary optimality conditions for an appropriate dynamic Stackelberg game. In this paper we consider three models of dynamic taxation in continuous time and suggest a method for calculating their feedback Nash equilibria based on a sufficient condition for optimality. We show that the optimal tax on capital income is generally different from zero.
Introduction
Economists often resort to game theory to model relationships between firms, individuals and the government. The game theoretic approach is indispensable in situations where decision makers have different interests or different policy tools are available at their disposal. Public finance theory provides a wealth of opportunities to develop models characterized by strategic interactions. Whenever the government makes decisions about tax policy, it has to take into account the response of the taxpayers in terms of changes in their behaviour. It is well-known that raising tax rates does not necessarily lead to an increase in tax revenue. Beyond a certain level of taxation the revenue in fact falls due to the narrowing of the tax base. Furthermore, if the objective is not simply raising as much tax revenue as possible but rather it is the maximization of social welfare, determining the optimal tax policy becomes more complicated. Early contributions to the theory of taxation provided arguments in favor of progressive tax schedules under the assumption that all individuals shared the same utility and differed only in the levels of income. Later on, economists broadened the class of social welfare functions and began paying more attention to efficiency considerations. There are numerous examples of the distortionary effects of taxation. For instance, the introduction of a tax on capital reduces the amount of savings and thus decreases future income. Similarly, an individual would normally choose to work less in the presence of tax on labor income (especially if the schedule is progressive), as compared to the situation of no tax. The distortions associated with taxes have important welfare implications and this motivates the strong interest in public finance theory. In dynamic models of taxation the problem of choosing the optimal tax structure is even harder. In addition to the effects arising from redistribution of income across individuals, one has to take into account the redistribution between different moments of time. A key question is how to tax income from different sources, i.e. whether it is more profitable from welfare perspective to levy higher taxes on income from capital as compared to wage income or vice versa. A somewhat surprising answer to this question was given by Judd [6] and Chamley [2] . They independently arrived at the conclusion that the optimal tax on capital income approaches zero as time goes to infinity. In these two papers, as well as in most of the other contributions, the optimal taxation problem is stated formally as a Stackelberg game. Stackelberg games are characterized by hierarchical structure in the sense that one of the players (the leader) has an advantage over the other player (the follower). In optimal taxation models the role of the leader is naturally assigned to the government and firms and consumers are the followers. It is well known, however, that open-loop Stackelberg equilibria are generally time inconsistent [3] and without a reliable commitment mechanism they are not very plausible. In contrast, feedback Stackelberg and Nash equilibria are always time consistent [1] , a desirable property of economic policy. In this paper we propose a constructive approach to studying differential games. A sufficient condition for existence of stationary feedback Nash equilibria is proved. As an application of the proposed approach, we have reconsidered some well-known taxation models in continuous time. We present conditions ensuring the existence of strategies which constitute stationary feedback Nash equilibria for each of these models. Unlike most of the literature, where the feedback equilibria are obtained as solutions to appropriate Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations, we derive our results from sufficient conditions for optimality based on Pontryagin's maximum principle. For each of the models considered we provide examples.
One-dimensional tax models

General result
We consider a two-persons differential game on the interval [0 +∞). The formulation of the game in a general form, including the assumptions pertaining to the functions and the data involved are presented below. The evolution of the state : [0 ∞) → R is described by the differential equatioṅ
Each player aims at maximizing a utility functional of the form
The functions 1 and 2 , are the admissible controls of Player 1 and Player 2, respectively. For each player we introduce two sets of admissible controls, i.e for each = 1 2, we define the sets and . The first set is the set of so-called open-loop controls. Formally, consists of all measurable functions defined on the interval [0 +∞) whose values belong to the closed set U ⊂ R . The second one is the set of feedback controls. Formally, contains all locally Lipschitz functions : R → U . The use of feedback controls means that each of the players has information concerning the current state of the system for all ∈ [0 +∞). 
where 1 ∈ 1 is an arbitrary admissible control for which the solution of the Cauchy probleṁ
are well-defined. Similarly, for Player 2 we require that
2 ) for all 2 ∈ 2 , such that the solution of the respective Cauchy problem and the corresponding criterion are well defined. Next, we consider a specific differential game with scalar state variable and scalar controls , = 1 2. This game is important because it contains as particular cases some of the dynamic taxation models studied further. The dynamics of the system is determined as follows:
The performance criteria of Player 1 and Player 2 are given by the integrals
respectively. The following assumptions are made regarding the data:
and (·) are sufficiently smooth and (·) < 0 (0) = 0 (·) > 0 and
Let the couple of feedback strategies ( * 1 * 2 ) be a stationary feedback Nash equilibrium. The corresponding definition implies that *
∈
1 is a solution of the following optimal control problem solved by Player 1:
with respect to the control variable 1 ∈ 1 , and * 2 ∈ 2 is a solution of the following optimal control problem solved by Player 2:
with respect to 2 ∈ 2 and subject to˙
To formulate a sufficient condition for existence of a stationary feedback Nash equilibrium, we assume that there exist continuously differentiable functionsˆ 1 ∈ 1 andˆ 2 ∈ 2 that satisfy the following system of ordinary differential equations:
for each > 0, where
Define the current value Hamiltonian functions for the optimal control problems (8)- (11) and (12)- (15) as follows:
and the maximized Hamiltonian functions as
Now we are ready to formulate a sufficient condition for existence of a stationary Nash equilibrium. The proof is based on sufficient conditions for optimality as presented in [11] .
Proposition 2.1.
Assume that the following conditions hold true:
(C1) There exist feedback strategiesˆ , = 1 2, of the first and of the second player, respectively, such that the corresponding trajectoryˆ (·) of (3) is well defined on the interval [0 +∞), the performance criteria for both players are also well defined and the following equality holds true Remark 2.1.
Assumptions (C1)-(C5) imply that the sufficient condition in [11] can be applied. This is the main idea of the proof. In the next section we present examples showing that equalities (16) and (17) are sufficient to determine optimal feedback controls constituting stationary feedback Nash equilibria for the considered differential games. In fact, equation (16) and the conditions (C4) and (C5) ( equation (17) and condition (C1)) are related to the optimal control problem of Player 1 (Player 2). These equalities and conditions imply the adjoint equation, the condition for maximization of the Hamiltonian and the transversality condition for the optimal control problem of Player 1 (Player 2). Condition (C3) is important in the proof of the sufficient optimality condition (cf. [11] ).
Proof. First, consider the solution of the optimal control problem of Player 1. Let us substitute ( ),
, respectively, in equation (9). The smoothness of its right-hand side with respect to implies that this equation has a unique solution for each starting point. Since (0) = 0 and ( ) > 0, it follows from (16) that 1 (0) = 0, so ( ) ≡ 0 is the solution corresponding to the initial value (0) = 0. This fact and the uniqueness of solution imply that the solutionˆ ( ) corresponding toˆ 1 andˆ 2 , and starting from 0 > 0 remains positive on the time interval, where it is defined. According to the sufficient optimality conditions for the optimal control problem (8)-(11) (see [11] ), the relations 1 :
together with condition (C3) imply that the control-trajectory pair (ˆ 1 ˆ ) is a solution of this problem.
By taking the time derivative of (22) we obtainπ
The above equation is equivalent to (20). 1 In some of the equations we omit the time argument for better readability.
If the solutionˆ ( ), ∈ [0 +∞), is bounded, then the transversality condition will be satisfied. Let us assume that lim →+∞ˆ ( ) = +∞. Inequality (C4) implies the existence of a real number ξ < ρ and¯ > 0, such that
We set ( ) =ˆ ( )/ (ˆ ( )) > 0, ∈ [0 +∞). Then there exists T > 0 such that for each ≥ T we have thatˆ ( ) >¯ .
For these values of we calculatė
for each ≥ T . This ensures that the transversality condition holds since ξ < ρ, and hence
Next, we turn to the optimal control problem of Player 2. Analogously, the following relations:
together with condition (C3) in the proposition statement and the transversality condition lim
that the control-trajectory pair (ˆ 2 ˆ ) is a solution of the optimal control problem of Player 2. Let us substitute in equation (13) ( ), * 1 ( ( )) and 2 ( ) byˆ ( ),ˆ 1 ( ( )) andˆ 2 ( ( )), respectively. We set
and take the derivative with respect to of (26):
Because of (17) (· ·) ≥ 0 imply that λ is non-negative. Thus, the transversality condition is satisfied because of (C1).
Below we show how the above result can be applied to solve specific differential games arising from models of optimal taxation. Both general solutions and examples are provided for each case.
Linear output tax
Xie [12] considered a simple output tax model to illustrate the fact that sometimes open-loop Stackelberg solutions may be time consistent. In particular, he linked time consistency with a property of the game which he referred to as "controllability", i.e. the ability of the leader to influence the co-state variable in the follower's problem through its control. We take the output tax model and show how it can be solved explicitly with the aid of Proposition 2.1. First we consider the general case and next we solve the example provided in [12] . The players in this game are the government and the representative consumer. The consumer maximizes over an infinite time interval a utility functional, which depends on consumption , subject to the capital accumulation constraint. The instantaneous utility function U(·) is differentiable and concave. The production function F ( ) which depends on capital , has the standard properties F (0) = 0, F ( ) > 0 and F ( ) < 0 for > 0. The positive number ρ indicates how the consumer values present consumption as opposed to the future one. Formally, the restrictions on the dynamics are described as follows:
where τ denotes the output tax chosen by the government. The consumer and the government have utility functionals
respectively. Here the utility function V (·), which depends on the collected tax revenue, is also assumed to be differentiable and concave. Thus, in this model social welfare depends both on the amount of collected taxes and on the consumption of the agent through the functions U and V . Let ( * τ * ) represent a stationary feedback Nash equilibrium of this game. Then * is the optimal control of the consumer's problem
where τ * denotes the output tax which is the solution of the government's problem of maximizing social welfare. The government solves
with respect to τ and subject to˙
Let assumptions (C1) and (C3)-(C5) in Proposition 2.1 hold true. If there exist continuously differentiable functionsˆ ( ) andτ( ) satisfying the system of ordinary differential equations:
( ) = F ( ) F ( ) (ρ + F ( )τ ( )) (33) V (F ( )τ( ))(F ( )τ( ) + F ( )τ ( ))(F ( )(1 −τ( )) −ˆ ( )) = V (F ( )τ( ))(ρ − F ( ) +ˆ ( )) − U (ˆ ( ))ˆ ( )(34)
then the couple (ˆ ( ) τ( )) represents a stationary feedback Nash equilibrium for the game (27)-(32).
Proof. The proof follows directly from Proposition 2.1 with 2 = τ and (τ) = 1 − τ. Note that for this problem equations (33) and (34) are equivalent to equations (16) and (17), respectively since
Example 2.1.
This example is studied in [12] . Let F ( ) = A , U( ) = ln( ), V (A τ) = ln(A τ). We shall show that the controlsˆ ( ) = ρ andτ( ) = solve the game for α = A/ρ. It is straightforward to see that conditions (C3) and (C5) are satisfied. We need to verify equations (33) and (34) and to ensure that (C1) holds true. Equation (33) is obvious. To verify the second equation, call LHS and RHS the left-hand side and the right-hand side of (34), respectively. We have
so they are equal. Finally, the transversality condition in the optimal control problem of the government is also satisfied for this example since V (Aˆ τ(ˆ ))ˆ = 2 ρ = .
With the above optimal controls the differential equation for capital becomeṡ
The above solution coincides with that in [12] .
It is interesting to note that Xie in [12] obtained this result using a different equilibrium concept. As already mentioned, he was concerned with the time inconsistency property of open-loop Stackelberg solutions and used this example as an illustration that sometimes these solution are time-consistent. In a recent paper Rubio [10] derived conditions leading to equivalence of the feedback Nash and feedback Stackelberg equilibria under the implicit assumption that the value function is C 1 . Rubio introduced the notion of "orthogonal reaction functions", referring to the property that the mixed partial derivatives of the utility functions and the right-hand side of the dynamics equation with respect to the controls of the two players are zero. He proved a proposition that for the class of differential games with orthogonal reaction functions, if the stationary feedback Nash equilibrium exists, it coincides with the stationary feedback Stackelberg equilibrium, independently of which player acts as a leader. It is easy to see that for the above example Rubio's conditions are met and in fact we have a coincidence of open-loop, feedback Stackelberg and feedback Nash equilibria.
Redistributive capital income taxation
The model considered in this section was originally proposed by Judd [6] . It studies the question of how income from capital should be taxed. There are three types of agents in the model economy -capitalists, workers and a government. In the simple setting considered here, capitalists do not work and receive income only from capital ownership. Capital is used for the production of a single good which can be consumed or saved and invested. Workers supply labor inelastically for which they receive wages and in addition, the government grants them a lump-sum transfer or subtracts a lump-sum tax from their labor income. The production technology is described by the function F ( ) with the standard properties that F (0) = 0, F ( ) > 0 and F ( ) < 0 for positive . Capital depreciates at a constant rate δ > 0 and F ( ) − δ is output net of depreciation. Further, capital is assumed to be bounded. This assumption is also made in [6] and it seems to hold true for reasonable specifications of the production and utility functions. The static profit maximization conditions for the competitive firm are:
where denotes the interest rate and is the wage paid to the worker. Since in this setup workers do not save, their consumption equals income. The workers' income φ is composed of wage earnings plus a government transfer T (or minus a lump-sum tax, depending on the sign of T ) which is determined as the tax rate τ times the capital income:
The problem that the representative capitalist faces is to maximize his lifetime utility subject to the capital accumulation constraint. The utility function U( ) is assumed to be increasing in consumption and concave. The problem of the government is to find a tax rule τ that maximizes welfare which is represented by the weighted sum (γ being the weight) of the instantaneous utilities of the capitalist U( ) and the worker V (φ). The utility function V (φ) is also concave. Formally, the restrictions on the dynamics are described as follows: 
−ρ U( ( )) and
respectively. Let the couple of strategies ( * τ * ) represent a stationary feedback Nash equilibrium of the above game. This means that * is the optimal control of the capitalist's problem:
Also, τ * is the optimal control of the government's problem:
Judd approached the capital income taxation problem as an open-loop Stackelberg game and arrived at the interesting result that the optimal tax tends to zero as time goes to infinity. Although this finding has become widely accepted in public economics, the validity of the zero limiting capital income tax has been questioned in different contexts. For example, Kemp et al. [7] claim that in the original open-loop formulation of Judd's model the optimal tax rate on capital income may not converge to a stable equilibrium and when a feedback Stackelberg solution is considered, the equilibrium tax rate could be positive or negative. Lansing [9] provides a counter-example to the redistributive tax model examined by Judd, and argues that with logarithmic utility function of capitalists the optimal tax is non-zero. However, he claims that the obtained result is specific to this functional form and will not be true in the general case. Below we show that under rather general assumptions about the utility and production functions the optimal tax is different from zero when the solution is sought in the class of feedback Nash equilibria.
Proposition 2.3.
Let assumptions (C1) and (C3)-(C5) in Proposition 2.1 hold true. If there exist continuously differentiable functionsˆ ( ) andτ( ) satisfying the system of ordinary differential equations:
( ) = ( ) ( ) (ρ + ( )τ ( )) (41) γV (φ( τ( ))) φ( τ( ))((1 −τ( )) ( ) −ˆ ( )) = = γV (φ( τ( )))[ρ + δ − F ( ) +ˆ ( )] − U (ˆ ( ))ˆ ( )(42)
the couple (ˆ ( ) τ( )) represents a stationary feedback Nash equilibrium for the game (35)-(40).
Proof. The proof follows from Proposition 2.1 with
It is straightforward to see that equation (41) is equivalent to (16). Equation (42) in turn is equivalent to (17). To show this, note that φ τ ( τ) = ( ), so we have that
Also, note that
so that the right-hand side of (17) becomes
We shall show that the feedback Nash equilibrium for this example is the pair of functionŝ 
and finally,
The latter gives a relationship between the parameters of the model. This equation would allow us to determine the constant β (and hence α) and to pin downˆ ( ) andτ( ). An important question is when equation (43) has a unique solution. Let
If we calculate the derivative G (β) we see that
is strictly decreasing and if a solution exists it is unique. Regarding existence, since β ∈ (ρ/σ +∞) and ( ) It can be solved explicitly and we find that
According to (44), ρ < β and from the solution of the differential equation for capital it follows that capital is bounded. More specifically,
The fact thatˆ is bounded ensures that the transversality conditions for the optimal control problems of the consumer and the government hold true. Indeed, for the optimal control problem of the consumer the transversality condition = 0 and it is satisfied wheneverˆ is bounded. Similarly, for the optimal control problem of the government the transversality condition holds true as well.
It is interesting to explore the behaviour of the capital income tax. Define the limiting capital income taxτ ∞ as the limit ofτ(ˆ ( )) as → ∞. We obtainτ
It can be shown that for different values of the parameters of the model in this example we may have positive or negative limiting capital income taxes. Negative taxes typically occur when capital is declining over time, so at some point it becomes optimal from the welfare perspective to grant a subsidy to capitalists in order to sustain a certain level of production. We note that for Judd's model, as well as for the output tax model, the condition for orthogonality of the reaction functions in [10] is satisfied and therefore, the feedback Nash equilibrium coincides with the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium. Generally, the computation of feedback Stackelberg equilibria is associated with considerable difficulties (see [4] ), so the framework developed above for Nash equilibria can be used to obtain also the Stackelberg equilibria whenever both coincide.
A model with government bonds
The model considered in this section is proposed by Chamley [2] . In an influential article he examined a dynamic taxation problem and showed that if the utility function is separable in consumption and labour, the optimal tax on capital income is zero in the long run. This is essentially the same result as the one obtained by Judd, despite the differences in the model formulation.
Frankel [5] studied the same problem and reconfirmed Chamley's findings in the case of separable utility functions. For more general utility functions he claimed that the capital income tax may be positive or negative depending on whether the sum of the elasticities of marginal utility with respect to consumption and labour is increasing or decreasing over time.
The model presented below follows the model studied in [5] with two differences. The first one is our assumption that the government expenditure depends on capital , while in [5] it is assumed that depends on time. Still, we retain the assumption that is given exogenously and hence it is not a control for the government. The second difference is condition (48) below. In [5] the left-hand side of (48) is greater than or equal to zero. But as it is shown in [8] , the existence of solution of the optimal control problem for the consumer implies that this condition is satisfied as equality.
For that reason we modify the condition (48) in the form of the usual transversality condition. Unlike the models discussed in the previous section, now the consumer chooses not only the consumption path but also how many hours to work (the labour input ). Also, in the optimal control problem of the representative agent the state variable is private assets . Private assets consist of capital and government bonds , that is = + . In our notation and stand for after tax capital and labour income, respectively. We consider the following differential game. On the one hand, the consumer maximizes his utility function given taxes on the wage and on the income from capital.
On the other hand, the government decides how to tax the wage and the income from capital in an optimal way so that to achieve the highest utility for the consumer and at the same time to be able to finance its expenditure . Formally, the restrictions on the dynamics are described as follows:
The meaning of the last equality is evident: the present value of the private assets tends to zero as tends to infinity. The consumer and the government have the same utility functional of the following form:
)) represent a stationary feedback Nash equilibrium of the above written game under the assumption that all controls depend only on the state variable . This assumption can be partly motivated by the fact that is the only state variable in the optimal control problem of the consumer. Moreover, typically the consumer observes only his own private assets and hence, the decision on his consumption and labour supply depend on them. Essentially, this assumption is technical. It is important for obtaining specific solutions of Chamley's problem. The aforementioned assumption and the definition of stationary feedback Nash equilibrium imply that ( * * ) and ( * * ) are solutions of the optimal control problem of the consumer and of the government, respectively. Formally, the consumer solves with respect to and the following optimal control problem:
The government chooses and so that to solve: An interesting question is whether the claim for zero optimal tax on capital is valid when feedback controls are considered. It turns out that in this case, even if the utility function is separable, the optimal tax can be different from zero. To find a stationary feedback Nash equilibrium of Chamley's optimal taxation problem, we can make use of the approach employed in the solution of the one-dimensional model. To do this we assume that the after-tax wage is proportionate to the after-tax income from capital. Before formulating the corresponding sufficient condition, we assume the existence of continuously differentiable functionsˆ andˆ determined by the following relations: 
We setˆ ( ) := β ( ) and define the Hamiltonian functions for the optimal control problems of the consumer and the government as follows:
The maximized Hamiltonians are defined as:
Now we are in a position to formulate a sufficient condition for existence of a stationary Nash equilibrium: 
and assume that for any and ≥ 0 the following relations hold true: Ψ( ) ≥ 0 and
Then the stationary feedback Nash equilibrium of the differential game (45)-(53) is given by the pairs (ˆ ( ) ˆ ( )) and (ˆ ( ) ˆ ( )) whenever the corresponding solution (ˆ (·) ˆ (·)) of the ODE system (50)-(51) are defined and bounded on the interval [0 +∞).
Proof. The proof follows the idea of Proposition 2.1. According to the sufficient optimality conditions, the relations
together with concavity of the maximized Hamiltonian H * and the transversality condition imply that (ˆ ˆ ˆ ) is an optimal control-trajectory pair of the optimal control problem of the consumer. We set π := U (ˆ (ˆ ) ˆ (ˆ )). Thus condition (59) is satisfied. Next, conditions (54), (55), (57) and (59) imply (60). From (54) and (59) it follows that for each ∈ [0 +∞) we have that π( ) (ˆ ( )) = α. Take the time derivative of both sides to obtainπ ( ) (ˆ ( )) + π( ) (ˆ ( ))˙ ( ) = 0 Substituting˙ ( ) with the right-hand side of (46) for the optimal controls, yields that the above equation is equivalent to (61). This is so because ( )ˆ ( ) − ( )ˆ ( ) = 0 which in turn follows from (57). The transversality condition holds true because of the equality (48) and because π(·) andˆ (·) are bounded. We now turn to the optimal control problem of the government. According to the sufficient optimality conditions the relations λˆ = 0
together with concavity of the maximized Hamiltonian function and the appropriate transversality condition imply that (τ ˆ ˆ ˆ ) is an optimal control-trajectory pair of the optimal control problem (49)-(53). We set λ( ) := 0 and µ( ) := Ψ(ˆ ( ) ˆ ( )). Then assumption (D3) implies that µ( ) ≥ 0. Clearly, the first two sufficient conditions are satisfied. The co-state equation for λ becomes
Using (54), (55), (57) and the sufficient conditions for the consumer's problem, it is straightforward to check that this equation holds true for µ defined as above. The co-state equation for µ is satisfied as well because of (58) The boundedness ofˆ andˆ implies that µ is also bounded, hence the transversality condition is verified. Notice that the boundedness of and actually prevents the government debt from becoming infinite. Otherwise the consumer will refuse to hold government bonds knowing that the government will not pay back.
The computation ofˆ ( ) andˆ is straightforward. Since the utility function is separable and the optimal labour input is It turns out that in the feedback formulation of the optimal taxation problem the taxes are generally different from zero even when the utility is separable. Note that in this example the government expenditure equals gross income minus net income (income after taxes) which is exactly the amount of collected tax revenue. This means that, starting with zero debt, the government does not have an incentive to borrow or accumulate assets and thus to redistribute income over time. This result may have something to do with the fact that the utility of the government coincides with that of the agent, i.e. the government does not derive utility from the collected taxes or the expenditure it makes. Since it cares only about the welfare of the consumer, it collects in the form of taxes exactly the amount which is needed to cover its current outlays. Finally, we may examine the evolution of the capital income tax for this particular problem. Before that, it is convenient to state explicitly the before-tax capital income˜ ( ) using the standard equilibrium condition that˜ ( ) = F ( ). The gross return on capital is˜ ( ) = 2σ Interestingly, in this example the optimal tax depends only on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption. It will be negative for σ < 1/2.
